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Abstract
There are three prominent solutions to the Darwinian problem of altruism, kin selection,
reciprocal altruism, and trait group selection. Only one, reciprocal altruism, most commonly
implemented in game theory as a TIT FOR TAT strategy, is not based on the principle of
conditional association. On the contrary, TIT FOR TAT implements conditional altruism in the
context of unconditionally determined associates. Simulations based on Axelrod's famous
tournament have led many to conclude that conditional altruism among unconditional partners
lies at the core of much human and animal social behavior. But the results that have been used
to support this conclusion are largely artifacts of the structure of the Axelrod tournament,
which explicitly disallowed conditional association as a strategy. In this study, we modify the
rules of the tournament to permit competition between conditional associates and conditional
altruists. We provide evidence that when unconditional altruism is paired with conditional
association, a strategy we called MOTH, it can outcompete TIT FOR TAT under a wide range of
conditions.
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 The Problem of Altruism
1.1
In discussions of the biological evolution of social behavior, an organism is altruistic, by
definition, when it enhances the relative reproduction of another organism at some cost to its
own (Sober and Wilson 1998). The existence of altruistic behavior seems to present a paradox
for evolutionary theorists because reproductive advantage is thought by many to be the
principal engine of evolutionary change. The problem is, of course, that altruistic benefactors
are at a reproductive disadvantage to their non-altruistic beneficiaries. In game theoretic
discussion, this disadvantage is often embodied in a game in which 1) when altruists interact,
they exchange the cost and benefit of altruism, 2) when altruists interact with selfish
individuals, the altruist pays the cost and the selfish individual receives the benefit, 3) and when
selfish individuals interact, they receive no benefit and expend no cost. The basic payoff
structure of "Altruist Game" is shown in Table 1.1.2
Given that humans and other animals do in fact cooperate, the challenge to the evolutionary
theorist has been to find some mechanism that will permit altruism to resist elimination or to
eliminate more selfish alternatives. Two answers to this challenge, kin selection and trait-group
selection, are conditional association strategies: They postulate a bias in the selection of social
partners such that altruists meet altruists more often than by chance, and selfish individuals
meet altruists less often than by chance. This is mathematically straightforward:
p = the proportion of altruists in the population
pA,A = the probability that an altruist encounters another altruist
pS,A = the probability that a selfish individual encounters an altruist
1.3
If selfish and altruistic individuals are equally represented in a population and encounters occur
at random, then pA,A = p = pS,A. In these circumstances, selfish individuals will outperform
altruists and eventually the entire population will become selfish. But suppose that altruists
discriminate, with the result that pA,A > pS,A. Simple algebra shows that an unconditionally
altruistic strategy will prevail over an unconditionally selfish strategy whenever the difference
between pA,A and pS,A is greater than the ratio of costs (c) to benefits (b) (See Table 2). Kin
selection theorists will recognize this principle as the basis of Hamilton's inequality, r > c/b,
where r is defined as the degree of relatedness amongst associates. Group selection theorists
will recognize it as the principle underlying trait group section (Sober and Wilson 1998) that
partially segregates altruistic and selfish individuals into different ephemeral groups.Tit for Tat Reciprocity
1.4
One remarkably influential solution to the altruism problem does not appear to be of that form.
It has been based on a "TIT FOR TAT" strategy in an iterated prisoners' dilemma game. In
prisoners' dilemmas, altruists are called Cooperators and selfish individuals, Defectors. A
prisoners' dilemma game imagines a situation in which two arrested individuals are being
coaxed to confess to doing a crime. In such a scenario, there is a reward for cooperation (R), a
temptation to defect (T), a loss suffered when a loyal "sucker" is betrayed (S), and a punishment
for non-cooperation (P). Any game can be categorized as a prisoners' dilemma so long as T > R
> P > S and 2R > (T + S) (See Table 3). It should be noted that all payoff patterns that are
altruist games are also prisoners' dilemma games.
1.5
TIT FOR TAT (hereafter, "TFT") was made famous by its repeated triumph against other
strategies in the prisoners' dilemma tournaments summarized in Robert Axelrod's book, TheEvolution of Cooperation (1984). So influential was this work that it has served as the basis for
hundreds of articles in which TFT reciprocity is used to explain various features of human and
animal social behavior. However, this work did not consider in depth how the behavioral options
of Axelrod's tournaments reflect the behavioral options of animals. We are specifically
concerned that, in the Axelrod's tournaments, a player remained with its assigned partner until
the number of moves stipulated for the game was completed. This constraint seems to violate
an almost universal feature of animal psychology: Animals tend to leave a situation that they find
distasteful (Thorndike 1911). Even theorists who favor use of the TFT strategy to explain animal
behavior have implicitly conceded that this aspect of the tournament structure is quite artificial
(Trivers 1971). When using TFT to explain natural social systems, theorists must speculate that
partners recognize one another and remember what each did on previous occasions. That is,
given that I am likely to move away from someone who acted against me, implementing a TFT
strategy requires that I, at a minimum, recognize the individual when I meet them again and
remember that they defected against me days, months, or even years ago. Maintaining this level
of cognitive complexity is difficult, as neural tissue is the most energetically costly to maintain.
But the TFT strategy in the simulated tournaments does not require complex cognition, only
"knowledge" of what was done to it last, as it is bound to a single partner for prolonged periods.
Thus, the strategy incurs none of the costs for maintaining cognitive complexity that would be
suffered by an animal trying to implement a TFT strategy in nature.
Cooperation in "non-forced" games
1.6
Years ago researchers interested in economic decision-making became curious about how the
option of leaving a market affected cooperation (Hirschman 1970). When implemented in
iterative prisoners' dilemma games the "exit option" is meant to represent this freedom to walk
away (Orbell and Dawes 1993). Yamagishi and Hayashi (1996) referred to such games as non-
forced play paradigms and reviewed their history in depth. In addition to purely mathematical
exploration, empirical studies of human behavior in prisoners'-dilemma type experiments have
demonstrated that the presence of an exit option affects performance. For example, Boone and
Macy (1999) showed that people do take advantage of the opportunity to leave partners, and
cooperation does increase when participants in prisoners' dilemma tournaments are given the
option of leaving.
1.7
However, these exit strategies were not well-suited to an evolutionary context and required
extensive cognitive capacity on the part of agents. For example, Sherratt and Roberts' (1998)
model required individuals to remember the outcome of every match they played, keep a
running total of performance, and remember the partner for every previous match. Individuals
then chose whether to sit-out a match if they encountered an undesirable player again. Using
genetic algorithms, Sherratt and Roberts showed that such "choosiness" could evolve (assuming
no cost of cognitive capacity). Similarly, Macy and Skvoretz (1998) implemented leaving
strategies that required extensive cognitive ability. In their simulation, individuals displayed
signs that could be attended to or ignored. If a strategy chose to "look at" its partner's signs,
then the partner was accepted or rejected based on the average value of observed signs. If both
partners found the other acceptable a priori, then the strategies played a single-game match in
which they either cooperated or defected. Further, strategies could distinguish "neighbors" from
"non-neighbors" and could respond to "greetings" by their partner. Macy and Skvoretz also
used genetic algorithms so that any change in strategy between generations was the result of
genetic "memory" for the value of signs, being a neighbor, and so on. The non-iterative
scenario made it impossible to assess the success of their models against conditional prisoners'
dilemma strategies (such as TFT). Similar levels of complication are found in numerous other
simulations.
1.8
We seek to support the argument that cooperation can be explained by the most simple,
evolutionarily feasible, cognitively undemanding mechanism of conditional association.
MOTH reciprocity1.9
The most parsimonious conditional association model would simply have agents leave partners
who defect against them but stay with partners who cooperate. That is, organisms must merely
exhibit a tropism that leads them away from unpleasant stimuli. We called this strategy, My-way
Or The Highway, or MOTH for short. Such a strategy requires far less "knowledge" than the
previously considered leaving strategies. It requires the same amount of "knowledge" in
simulated situations that TFT does, only needing to know what happened last. However, unlike
TFT, MOTH requires no additional knowledge to be implemented in natural situations.
1.10
Far from requiring individual recognition and memory of long past events, implementing MOTH
only requires that organisms respond to operant conditioning (i.e., not do things for which they
were previously punished). Moreover, MOTH would be a powerful competitor because it would,
in effect, sort through the population "looking for" other altruists. As a result, pA,A - pS,A would
increase steadily with successive iterations of the game. Note that MOTH switches partners
following the same rule by which TFT switches roles. TFT is a conditional altruist that associates
unconditionally; MOTH is an unconditional altruist that associates conditionally.
1.11




To explore these ideas, David Joyce prepared an evolutionary tournament in Java, in which
players of eight different strategies played two-player matches consisting of a series of PD
and/or altruist games. (See http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/Moth/battle/Battle.html) At the
end of each set of matches, the number of individuals playing each strategy was adjusted
according to the results of the previous match. The eight strategies (See Table 4) varied in their
ability to leave or stay with a partner and to cooperate or defect with the partner they have.
Three of the eight are from Axelrod's tournament: ALL-C, ALL-D, and TFT. The five others were
various different permutations of the two principles, leaving/staying, cooperating/defecting.
2.2
Because of the increasing use of NETLOGO (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/) in social
science modeling (Axelrod 1997; see also Axtell, Axelrod, Epstein, and Cohen 1996), Owen
Densmore later "docked" our model in NETLOGO. Subsequent testing showed the two models to
give identical results. Furthermore, preliminary explorations with the NETLOGO model showed
that the differences between the outcomes of the 3, 0, 5, 1 prisoners' dilemma model and the
altruist model are negligible. Thus, we report here only the outcome of experiments with the
NETLOGO version of the model on standard 3, 0, 5, 1 prisoners' dilemma games. Readers may




The structure of the NETLOGO tournament is designed, insofar as possible, to mimic the
structure Axelrod's evolutionary tournament. N players are assigned to S strategies at random
and without replacement. A strategy is a set of rules that determines which of the options
(cooperate, defect, or leave) a player will adopt under a specified set of circumstances. The
tournament proceeds through a set number of matches. Each match begins with players being
assigned partners at random, matches are made up of G iterations, or games, and the
tournament is M matches long. Between matches, the N players are reassigned to the S
strategies in proportion to their winnings in the previous match. The variables N, S, G, and M
are all parameters that can be adjusted in our model. The payoffs of the game are also
adjustable, although this report focuses, as we have said, on the 3,0,5,1 payoff matrix. Also
adjustable are the initial numbers of the eight strategies, so that each strategy can begin withanywhere from 0 to N players.
The Strategies
2.4
Eight strategies were available for comparison:
2.5
The variations between the eight strategies permitted us to explore the interactions between
three of the Axelrod tournament strategies, ALL-C, ALL-D, and TFT, playing against strategies
that could break partnerships any time during the match and resume playing with other
partnerless players picked at random. The simplest version of this strategy was MOTH,
described above, which is identical to ALL-C except that it left if its partner defected. Other
variants were HIT AND RUN, which always defected and always left after the first round, SANTA,
which always cooperated but always left after the first round, NASTY MOTH, which always
defected but stayed around until its partner defected, and NASTY HIT AND RUN, which defected
twice, but left immediately if its partner defected in the first game and then left unconditionally
after the second game, no matter what its partner did.
2.6
The eight strategies can be thought of as varying simultaneously along three dimensions.
First Cooperate or First Defect Strategies: Because on the first game of a match, strategies have no
information concerning the play of the other strategies, a first round decision must be made
unconditionally whether to cooperate or defect.
Conditional or Unconditional Strategies: On the second and subsequent rounds, conditional
strategies become possible, that is, strategies that were conditional on the other players' first
round move. Some strategies make use of that information and others do not.
Leave-Stay or Cooperate-Defect Strategies: Conditional strategies can be further distinguished on
the basis of what they did when their conditions were met.
Details of the Simulation
2.7
The players are paired off randomly. Simultaneously, each pair plays a single game. After that
game, either player or both may decide to leave the partnership, in which case the partnership
dissolves and both players are randomly re-paired with a partnerless player for the next game
(they may be re-paired with the same partner); if neither wants to leave, the partnershipremains intact for the next game. At the end of a match, scores for each player are tallied, and
the number of players of each strategy for the next match will be proportional to the total score
for all the players of that strategy. In this way, the total number of players in the tournament is
maintained at a constant. For instance, suppose that at the end of a match between 100 players,
45 ALL-C players and 55 ALL-D players. The 45 ALL-C players have a total score of 1000 while
the 55 ALL-D players have a total score of 1500. In the next match there will be 40 ALL-C
players and 60 ALL-D players, since 1000:1500 = 40:60. If the proportion doesn't come out
perfectly, the proportions will be rounded down and the remaining required players will be
assigned to strategies with a probability determined by the same proportion.
2.8
Key variables in the simulations were numbers of games per match, the combinations of
strategies in the simulation, and the starting frequencies of strategies in the simulation. As a
general rule, 20 simulations were run to establish the value of parameter combination.
2.9
We conducted four types of tournaments: 1) MOTH vs. the 7 other strategies, 2) MOTH vs. the 3
non-leaving strategies, 3) MOTH and TFT separately vs. the unconditional strategies, and 4)
MOTH vs. TFT invading the 6 other strategies. All tournaments began with equal numbers of all
strategies, except type 4 tournaments, in which there were a smaller numbers of MOTH and TFT
players initially.
Results
Moth Versus the Other Seven Strategies
3.1
Simulations indicated that strategy success in these tournaments was most strongly affected by
the number of games per match. A critical region was found between four and ten games per
match. At shorter game lengths, first round defectors, such as HIT AND RUN, do well. At longer
game lengths first round cooperators, including MOTH, do well.
Figure 1.
3.2
These effects are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the averages of 20 simulations. Eachsimulation consisted of 40 matches, but with match lengths ranging from 2 to 320 games,
varying on a roughly logarithmic scale. Each strategy started off with ten players. Each bar
represents final percentage achieved by each strategy when matches consisted of the number of
games indicated on the x-axis.
3.3
The graph dramatically shows the success of MOTH (and other first cooperator strategies)
above a threshold of 10 games per match. It also shows the dependency of cooperative
strategies, and MOTH in particular, on the game structure of the tournament. Interestingly, the
graph also shows the power of leaving strategies, HnR and NasMOTH, against the pure
defection strategy in matches with fewer games.
Moth Against Non-leaving Strategies
3.4
To test whether MOTH's success requires other conditional association strategies, we ran
simulations pitting MOTH against the three non-leaving strategies from Axelrod's tournaments,
TFT, ALL-D, and ALL-C. MOTH's performance was very similar to that found in the first
simulation. Even in this limited field of competition, the outcome of the competition between
first cooperator strategies and first defector strategies is highly dependent on match length. As
match lengths increase, the first round cooperator strategies establish a strong collective
majority over ALL-D at four games per match and nearly eliminate ALL-D in longer matches
(See Figure 2). Amongst the two first cooperator conditional strategies, MOTH was consistently
superior to TFT across parameters. It establishes a plurality at four games per match and a
majority in longer matches. It should be noted, however, that MOTH does have a slightly weaker
majority playing in this context than it does against the full field of eight strategies.
Figure 2.
MOTH and TFT vs. the Unconditional Strategies
3.5
Next, we ran TFT and MOTH separately against ALL-C and ALL-D to test whether the
conditional leaving strategy faired better than the conditional defecting strategy in competition
against the two unconditional strategies. MOTH had a slightly better record overall, achieving a
majority at four games per match, whereas TFT's required at least five games per match.
Further, MOTH averaged approximately 90% of the players in longer games, whereas TFT
averaged 85%. (See Figures 3 and 4)3.6
Interestingly, the fate of ALL-D in the two tournaments is slightly different. The combination of
ALL-C and TFT eliminates ALL-D in any match of greater length than 20 games; however, the
combination ALL-C and MOTH does NOT extinguish ALL-D players, even in the longest
matches. If ability to drive competing strategies to extinction was considered desirable, this




One measure of the power of a strategy as an evolutionary competitor is its capacity to invade a
population already well-occupied by players of other strategies. This capacity is significant
because, as evolutionary change is usually understood, any novel type must begin its career at a
great numerical disadvantage. To explore these issues, MOTH and TFT were run at starting
frequencies of 5, 10, and 20 players against the six other strategies started at 50 players each.
Because match length had proven to be such a potent variable above, these invasion simulations
were run at 5, 10, and 20 games per match.
3.8
The results are presented in Figure 4, a-c, which affords three different sorts of comparisons.Figures 4a, 4b and 4c.
3.9
Comparing the charts, 4a-c demonstrates, once again, the importance of match length as a
variable. At the end of five-game matches, no first cooperator strategy is represented by more
than one or two players. At the end of 10 or 20 game matches, first cooperator strategies have
virtually eliminated all first defector strategies.
3.10
Each individual chart affords a comparison of the capacities of MOTH and TFT to invade multi-
strategic populations of 300 players. Note that (in all but one case) if TFT has surviving players
at the end of a tournament, MOTH has more. At 10 and 20 games per match, MOTH
outcompetes TFT at ratio of approximately ten to one. Further, in the face of competition from
MOTH, TFT is continually bested by ALL-C.
3.11
Comparing the heights of bars within each chart gives the effect of different starting
frequencies on MOTH and TFT success. The general outcome is that these effects are small.
Both strategies do slightly better at higher starting frequencies, and both do slightly better




These results show that, when prisoners' dilemma games are modified so that both conditional
association and conditional altruism are possible strategies, a conditional association
outcompetes conditional altruism in a wide variety of conditions. To the extent that computer
simulations can ever guide our understanding of human and animal sociality, this outcome
implies that students of animal and human social behavior have been too quick to adopt
conditional altruism as a principal solution to the problem of social evolution. The success of
TFT in prisoners' dilemma tournaments has been largely an artifact of the structural limitations
of those games. The results of Axelrod-type tournaments do not indicate the universality of
conditional altruism as a principle of cooperation in situations where animals can leave their
partners.4.2
Beyond the robustness of conditional association in our computer tournaments, there are many




When attempting to explain animal sociality (rather than merely altruism), MOTH is more
parsimonious than TFT. This is because TFT strategists must repeatedly come into contact with
the same partners to gain a benefit from their strategy. Yet the logic of conditional altruism
provides no mechanisms for such a social tropism. Any such mechanism would entail
conditional altruists conditionally associating. That is, employing a strategy of conditional
altruism requires partners to also conditionally associate. However, employing a strategy of
conditional association does not require organisms to be conditional altruists. If one is an
unconditional altruist and attaches oneself only to other altruists, no other principles are
required to sustain sociality.
Generality
4.4
One does, of course, need some sort of principle to sustain conditional association. But that
principle is readily available. Both classical and operant conditioning, widely dispersed in the
animal kingdom, and both of which have their analogues in the plants (see Barker 1993), can be
called upon to account for why creatures should stay where their surroundings please them. So,
for instance, to use the example that Trivers (1971) relies on so heavily in his classical
publication on reciprocal altruism, the cleaner fish and his clients need not recognize each
other as individuals; to support the symbiosis, they need only to be territorial and to show up at
the same place and the same time. So, in fact, what is usually taken as the classical example of
conditional altruism is actually an excellent example of conditional association. This fact is
clearly demonstrated by the success of the cleaner mimic, who does not need to mimic a
specific individual. If he looks like ANY member of the cleaner species and shows up at the right
time and place, he can feed off the flesh of the client species with impunity.
4.5
Individual recognition is a demanding threshold to meet in animal social interactions. As Konrad
Lorenz's work has made abundantly clear (Lorenz 1935), the majority of creatures know each
other only as disembodied sign stimuli, not as individuals. Individual recognition is not only a
significant evolutionary accomplishment, but a late one. To build a theory of sociality on a
principle that requires individual recognition is to limit the applicability of that theory to a
relatively few organisms.
4.6
MOTH is a more general solution to the problem of reciprocation in another sense. MOTH, like
kin selection and trait-group selection, is a conditional association strategy. It works by
increasing the proportion of altruists that meet other altruists and decreasing the proportion of
selfish individuals that meet altruists. Thus the success of MOTH holds out the possibility of
unifying evolutionary theories of altruism into a single theory of conditional association being
arrived at by three different mechanisms, rather than as three different kinds of "selection."
Final Words
4.7
The theory of conditional altruism has provoked much important research and some
unexpected findings. Perhaps its most interesting success has been the manner in which
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) and their colleagues have used it to rework our understanding of
logical thinking and cognitive heuristics (c.f., Buller 2005). However, having conceded this
benefit, we also must admit that the TFT principle may have been widely overextended. For
instance, the most often cited example of TFT altruism, Wilkinson's vampire bats (1984), is
arguably not an example of conditional altruism but rather an example of unconditional altruismaccompanied by conditional association.
4.8
MOTH has the value of raising research issues seldom considered by the reciprocal altruism
literature. In natural coalitions, such as those observed in chimpanzees (de Waal 1982), there is
a cost of breaking off a partnership. Partners may resist desertion and may inflict punishments
on deserters. Furthermore, the possibility of leaving introduces a spatial dimension to social
relations not reflected in Axelrod-type strategies. It is our intention, in future versions of this
model, to introduce concepts of distance, interposition, and punishment for leaving.
4.9
Further work is surely needed to determine how MOTH fairs against alternative strategies in
ever more true-to-nature contests. Moreover, much work can be done to develop the
mathematics of MOTH's success. Until that further research is done, the current research is
sufficient to conclude that MOTH is capable of outcompeting TFT in many conditions. Given the
seat of power granted to TFT by many evolutionary theorists, this should serve as a reminder
that for the same reasons models are powerful aids to thought, they are also powerful limiters.
Every one who uses a model should be deeply aware of the limitations of generality implied by
its structure.
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